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A FRESH APPROACH TO ROBINSON-PATMAN:
PRICE DIFFERENTIAL AS PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
PETER A. DONOVAN*
In FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' the Supreme Court rendered
a decision under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which, although
strictly limited in scope, has far reaching implications and promises
to effect a change in the format of future price discrimination cases.
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, provides in part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce . . . to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . .
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them. . . 2
Thus § 2(a) makes unlawful, price discriminations having the
proscribed competitive effects in three distinct levels or "lines of com-
merce," commonly termed the primary-line (injury to competition
between sellers), 3 the secondary-line (injury to competition between
purchasers),4 and the third or tertiary-line (injury to competition
* A.B. 1957, LL.B. 1960, Boston College; Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice. The opinions expressed herein are those of the writer and not
necessarily those of the Department of Justice,
1 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. fi 13(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
3 Anheuser-Busch is itself a case involving primary-line price discrimination. See
also, for examples, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) ; Atlas Build-
ing Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) ; Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716
(4th Cir. 1957) ; E, B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Nat'l
Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924); and Mennan Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed.
774 (2d Cir. 1923).
4 See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; George Van Camp &
Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929) ; Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp.
560, 563 (D. Del. 1956); aff'd, 237 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Naifeh v. Robinson
Art Metal Works, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 690, 694 (W.D. Okla. 1953), aff'd, 218 F.2d 202,
205 (10th Cir. 1954); Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir.
1939) ; Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. /958),
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between customers of purchasers)."
In the Anheuser-Busch case, a leading national brewer sold a
"premium beer"° priced higher than the beers of regional and local
breweries in the great majority of markets although both the price
of the Anheuser-Busch beer and the premium differential varied
from market to market and from time to time.? In 1953 most of the
national breweries, including Anheuser-Busch, granted their employees
a wage increase, and raised their prices.' Although many regional
and local breweries throughout the country followed suit by raising
their prices, Anheuser-Busch's competitors in the St. Louis market
maintained their existing price. Twice in 1954 Anheuser-Busch re-
duced the price of its premium beer in the St. Louis market without
making corresponding reductions in other markets.° It did not again
raise its price for over a year. During the period in which the price
differential existed, there was an over-all increase in beer sales in
the St. Louis market of less than ten percent, but Anheuser-Busch's
sales increased more than 200%. Of its three competitors, one suf-
fered a slight loss while the sales of the others declined 33% and 41%,
respectively.
The Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint in 1955
charging Anheuser-Busch with a violation of § 2(a)." The com-
plaint described a pricing pattern having adverse effects upon sellers'
competition (primary-line competition), but not upon buyers' corn-
5 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S.
231 (1951) ; Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), petition for
cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 865 (1957).
6
 A "premium beer" is one that is advertised and sold nationally at a premium
over the local or regional beers which are confined in advertisement and sales to
a limited geographical area.
7
 The market structure in the beer industry is such that there are few national
sellers and many regional of local sellers. There is competition among them in numerous
regional and local markets throughout the country. The structure of each market
varies and consequently the same beers are sold at different prices in different markets,
the premium beers, however, selling at a higher price than the beers of the regional
or local breweries.
s It appears that Anheuser-Busch did not raise its prices in Missouri or Wisconsin.
However, in view of the limited question reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court,
this fact was immaterial.
9 On January 4, 1954, Anheuser-Busch lowered its price from $2.93 to $2.68
per case, thereby reducing the previous 58 cents premium differential to 33 cents.
A second price cut occurred on June 21, 1954, this time to $2.35, the same price
charged by Anheuser-Busch's competitors. In March 1955, Anheuser-Busch increased
its St. Louis price 45 cents per case, and its three competitors almost immediately
raised their prices 15 cents. A substantial difference was thereby again established.
This ended the period of alleged price discrimination. The FTC made no claim that
the January 4th reduction was discriminatory, but based its contentions on the June
21st reduction.
10 Trade Reg. Rep. (1954-1955 FTC Cas.) 25441.
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petition (secondary-line competition). Both the hearing examiner"
and the Commission 12 held that the evidence introduced at the hearing
established a violation of § 2(a).
The Commission rejected Anheuser-Busch's contention that its
price reduction had been made in good faith to meet the equally
low price of a competitor within the meaning of the proviso to § 2 (b)."
The Commission then adopted and issued the examiner's cease and
desist order with slight modification. The Seventh Circuit set aside
the order, holding the price cuts not discriminatory because "W here
must be some relationship between the different purchasers which
entitles them to comparable treatment" before a price discrimination
within the meaning of § 2(a) may be found to exist. 14 Thus the
Seventh Circuit interpreted "different purchasers" to mean "com-
peting purchasers."15
Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit decided Atlas Building
Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.",° a private treble
damage action" brought by a local manufacturer and seller of cinder
11 Trade Reg. Rep. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) If 26257.
12 Trade Reg. Rep. (19.57-1958 FTC Cas.) ¶ 26705.
13 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
14 265 F.2d 677, 681 (1959).
15 Id. at 681-82. The court reasoned:
Where two purchasers from a seller are competing with each other, that
competition creates a relationship that entitles them to comparable treatment
as to price, without which treatment there would be a discrimination in price
within the meaning of section 2(a). On the other hand, in a case like this,
where the purchasers from a seller are located in different areas of the country
and are not in competition with each other, there is generally no relationship
which entitles them to be charged the same prices. This is particularly true
when different prices in different markets are characteristic of all sellers in
the industry. Thus, a retailer in Boston or San Francisco, in paying a higher
price for beer than a retailer in St. Louis or Chicago, is in no way prejudiced
or treated unfairly.
For other ambiguous implications that price differentials as such are not "discrimina-
tory" unless quoted among competing customers, see General Shale Products Corp.
v. Struct Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941). Cf. Patman, The
Robinson-Patman Act 59 (1938).
15 Supra note 3.
17 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured by a violation
of any of the antitrust laws may sue for treble damages. 38 Stat. 7310 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act was specifically made
an amendment to the Clayton Act and, therefore, there was little doubt but that a
treble damage action would lie for a violation thereof. Section 3, however, although
explicitly forbidding local price reductions under specified circumstances, was not enacted
as an amendment to the Clayton Act. Section 3 does not depend upon the sanctions
provided in the Clayton Act but carries its own criminal sanctions. Consequently,
there was some doubt whether a private treble damage action would lie for its violation.
This issue was settled when the Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Nash-
ville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), and Safeway Stores v. Vance,
355 U.S. 389 (1958). These cases held that § 3 does not amend the Clayton Act, and
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blocks in Las Cruces, New Mexico (Diamond Block & Gravel Co.),
against an interstate manufacturer and seller of cinder blocks (Atlas
Building Products Co.). The crux of the charge was that Atlas
had lowered its price in Las Cruces, where it was in competition with
Diamond, without correspondingly lowering its price in a market
where it had a virtual monopoly, using funds obtained in the latter
market to finance its operations in the former. In holding such a
price difference discriminatory within the meaning of § 2(a), even
though competing purchasers were charged uniform prices . and dif-
ferences existed only among noncompeting purchasers, the Tenth
Circuit stated:
The same legal issue was before the Seventh Circuit in
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, . .
where the court was presented with the basic question
whether uniform local price cuts by an interstate manufac-
turer which disrupted the market to the injury of local com-
petitors, were price discriminations within the meaning of
Section 2(a). The court held that even though directed at
local competitors, the price cuts were not discriminatory,
apparently because they did not discriminate among local
competitors. This conclusion is apparently based upon the
theory contended for here that the statutory words "differ-
ent purchasers" means competing purchasers. We respect-
fully reject any such restriction upon Section 2(a). For,
we are convinced that geographic price discriminations em-
ployed for predatory ends are cognizable under either Sec-
tion 2(a) or Section 3, .... 18
As a result of these conflicting decisions, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Anheuser-Busch case, and, after reaching its
decision in that case, denied certiorari in the Atlas case."
that the Clayton Act sanctions are not available for violations of § 3. However, the
Supreme Court did recognize that violations of § 3 might also constitute violations
of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended. The question whether local price reductions
were violative of § 2(a) remained unsettled.
18 Supra note 3, at 9.55. The Court held that the jury could properly consider
the size of Atlas and its economic power in both markets, the position and expectation
of Diamond in a healthy Lac Cruces market, and the fact that Atlas' delivered price
in the market in which it had a virtual monopoly was 23.1 cents while its delivered
price in Las Cruces was 20 cents. The court found that adequate instructions were
given to the jury on the good-faith-meeting-of-competition defense and on the neces-
sity for a showing of a causal relationship between the price discrimination practiced
by Atlas and injury to Diamond. The trial court's instruction that the price dis-
crimination was actionable if there was a "reasonable possibility" of substantial lessen-
ing of competition was found to be correct under Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S.
726 (1945), and FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 4.
19 Supra note 3. The conflict on this issue actually involved three circuits since
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Because the Seventh Circuit had expressed some doubt whether
§ 2(a) was designed to protect primary-line competition, the Supreme
Court made it explicitly clear, from the legislative history of § 2(a), 20
from the cases decided both before and after the passage of the
Robinson-Batman Act amendments to the Clayton Act,' and from
the language of the statute itself,' that "§ 2 (a) is violated where
there is a price discrimination which deals the requisite injury to
primary-line competition, even though secondary-line and tertiary-
line competition are unaffected." 23
In the Supreme Court Anheuser-Busch conceded, contra the inter-
pretation of the Seventh Circuit, that the existence of a competitive
relationship among purchasers was not necessary to a finding of
"discrimination in price." But, it argued, there must be "proof that
the lower price is below cost or unreasonably low for the purpose
or design to eliminate competition and thereby obtain a monopoly. 724
The Court, however, in accepting the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
in Atlas, and in equating price discrimination with price difference,
did not reject these arguments as totally irrelevant in § 2 (a) pro-
ceedings. Such factors as the existence of a predatory intent and un-
the Ninth Circuit in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), had held the same way as the Seventh Circuit
in Anheuser-Busch.
20 H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914) ; S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4 (1914) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong, 2d Sess. (1936) ; S. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong,, 2d Sess. (1936) ; FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investiga-
tion, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
n 21 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234
(2d Cir. 1929) (decided under the original Clayton Act and assuming without ex-
pressly so deciding, that local price discrimination violated the Act) ; E. B. Muller & Co.
v. FTC, supra note 3 (dictum indicating that no competitive relationship between
buyers is necessary to establish a violation of § 2(a)) ; Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC,
supra note 3 (assuming that local price discriminations violate § 2(a)) ; Atlas Building
Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., supra note 3. See also Moore v. Mead's
Fine Bread Co., supra note 3 (sustaining a treble damage action in favor of a compet-
ing seller based partly upon a violation of § 2(a)). But see, Balian Ice Cream Co. v.
Arden Farms Co., supra note 19.
22 The Court stated, 363 U.S. at 543:
... The statute could hardly be read any other way, for it forbids price dis-
criminations "where the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them."
23 363 U.S. at 542-43.
24 Id. at 546. Anheuser-Busch also argued that the absence of a showing of such
unreasonably low price was the pivotal factor in the Seventh Circuit's decision. See
Brief for Respondent, pp. 20-24, FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 1. The
Commission, however, insisted that the Seventh Circuit's decision rested upon the
absence of competition among purchasers and challenged it as being tantamount to
holding § 2(a) not applicable to protect primary-line competition. Brief for Petitioner,
pp. 7-8, FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 1.
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reasonably low price cuts were conceded to have possible relevance
to the determination of injury to competition but were regarded as
irrelevant to the existence of a price discrirnination.25
Insofar as the Supreme Court's decision in Anheuser-Busch
stands for the proposition that § 2(a) prohibits price discriminations
between a seller's customers, whether or not those customers are
competitors, it is not subject to criticism. This conclusion is amply
supported by legislative and judicial authority. 26 The injury com-
plained of was injury to the seller's competitors, that is, injury to
primary-line competition. The purpose of the act, in its application
to this kind of competition, is to prevent injury to the seller's com-
petitors, not his customers. The relationship between purchasers
affected by the price discriminations or differences is, therefore, of
no import. The Seventh Circuit, by focusing its attention upon
Anheuser-Busch's customers, overlooked this important fact, but
the Supreme Court, looking to the policy of the Act in this area,
pointed out that, while the existence of competition among buyers
who are charged different prices by a seller is obviously important
in terms of adverse affects upon secondary-line competition, where
the purpose of the Act is to protect competition among the seller's
customers," "it would be merely a fortuitous circumstance so far
as injury to primary-line competition is concerned."28
The significance of Anheuser-Busch, however, does not lie in
its resolution of this issue. It has implications of major importance,
26
 363 U.S. at 549, 552. That this construction of the Robinson-Patman Act led
to a partial overlap between § 2(a.) and § 3 was considered irrelevant, the Court con-
cluding that although § 3, which provides criminal sanctions for territorial price cuts
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor, might appear
more relevant to the fact, § 2(a) was also applicable.
20 See notes 20 and 21 supra. In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., supra note 3,
and Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 21,
violations of § 2(a) were predicated upon injury to primary-line competition without
reliance upon the absence of competition as a relevant factor. E. B. Muller & Co.
v. FTC, supra note 3, contains dictum indicating that a competitive relationship be-
tween buyers is not neceanry to establish a § 2(a) violation in primary-line com-
petition. But see, Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra note 19, at 367-
68, wherein it was held that, despite the fact that the discrimination may be at the
primary level, a competitive relationship between buyers must be present before § 2(a)
can be violated.
Thus, prior to Anheuser-Busch it was held that reduction of price in one area to
an unreasonable level with intent to eliminate a competitor violated § 2(a), Moore
v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., supra, that reduction of price in one area without a
corresponding reduction elsewhere likewise violates § 2(a) where buyers in the two
areas are competitors, E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, supra, and proof that all buyers
in the same locality are charged the same price is not exculpatory, Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, supra note 18; cf. Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, supra note 21.
27 See in this regard FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 4.
28 363 U.S. at 546.
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extending far beyond its decision in this regard, for although the
complaint described a pricing pattern having adverse effects upon
primary-line competition only, the Supreme Court, in its opinion,
answered a question applicable to all three lines when, without
dissent, it equated price discrimination with price difference in the
following words:
.. We are convinced that whatever may be said with regard
to the rest of §§ 2 (a) and 2 (b)—and we say nothing here—
there are no overtones of business buccaneering in the § 2(a)
phrase "discriminate in price." Rather, a price discrimina-
tion within the meaning of that provision is merely a price
difference. [Emphasis supplied.]"
The Court pointed out, however, that its decision "does not raise
the specter of a flat prohibition of price differentials, inasmuch as
price differences constitute but one element of a § 2(a) violation.'
The remaining element, apart from the jurisdictional requirements
of commerce,3 ' is that the price differences must be found to have
the effect of creating substantial competitive injury.32 Moreover,
even if the discriminatory practice should cause substantial injury to
29 Id. at 549.
30 Id. at 553.
31 The coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act is not as broad as that of the
Sherman Act. The Sherman Act prohibitions apply to restrictive or monopolistic
business practices or activities wherever they occur as long as interstate commerce is
"affected." E.g., United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954) ; Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ; United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real
Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950) ; Mandeville Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948). On the other hand, the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act require that the discriminator be "engaged in commerce," that the chal-
lenged discrimination occur "in the course of such commerce," and that "either or any
of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in commerce. . . ." Rowe, Sales
of Commodities in Commerce: Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
67 Yale L.J. 1155, 1166 (1958).
32 In a secondary-line competition case, Corn Products Co. v. FTC, supra note 18,
at 738, the Supreme Court stated:
. . . § 2(a) does not require a finding that the discrimination in price has
in fact had an adverse effect on competition. .
	 . It is enough that they
"may" have the proscribed effect . . . the use of the word "may" was not to
prohibit discriminations having "the mere possibility" of those consequences,
but to reach those which would probably have the defined effect on competition.
This statement was reaffirmed and followed in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 4.
Indeed, some have commented that the injury requirement of § 2(a) has evolved
into an almost automatic inference from the differential itself. See Rowe, Borderline
Issues in Court and Commission Cases Under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act,
ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 60-72 (1956) ; Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L.J.
1 (1956) ; Von Kalinowski, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects, 17 ABA
Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 360 (1960).
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competition, it may be justified under one of the several exculpatory
provisions of §§ 2(a)" and 2(b). 34
33 Section 2(a) contains four such justification defenses; (1) cost defense pro-
vision, (2) quantity limits proviso, (3) customer selection proviso, and (4) the chang-
ing conditions exemption. The cost defense proviso states that nothing in the Act
"shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost
of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities
in which such commodities are . . . sold or delivered." However, that proviso is
immediately qualified by the quantity limits proviso which authorizes the Commission
to "fix and establish quantity limits . . . as to particular commodities or classes of
commodities, where it finds available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to
render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly
in any line of commerce." A further proviso exempts "price changes from time to time
where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods." Section 2(a) also contains a proviso declaring that nothing contained
in the Act "shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in
commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade."
At least one person has commented regarding these exculpatory provisions that the
cost justification proviso is the only § 2(a) defense worth considering since it is doubt-
ful whether the other defenses will ever have any substance or applicability. See
Barton, Defenses in Price Discrimination Cases, 17 ABA Antitrust Section Proceed-
ings 389 (1960). See also, Murray, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act:
Impossibility Revisited, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 227. The difficulty in presenting a satis-
factory cost justification on defense might have the effect of preventing a price re-
duction which is justified in those terms. See Rowe, Cost Justification Of Price Dif-
ferentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 584 (1959). See generally,
Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 155-79 (1955).
34 Section 2(b) contains an exculpatory provision commonly referred to as the good
faith meeting of competition defense. The proviso declares in part, that nothing in
the Act "shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor." The requirements for a valid good faith meeting of competition are set
out for the most part in FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958), and in an
earlier decision involving the same litigation, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231
(1951). Considerable confusion centers around the requirement that the price reduc-
tion be in "good faith" to meet a competitors "lawful" price. See Att'y. Gen. Nat'l
Comm. Antitrust Rep. 179-86 (1955); Note, Competitors' Lawful Prices and Lawful
Competition, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 327 (1958). Of all the Robinson-Patman Act defenses,
the cost justification defense of § 2(a) and the good faith meeting of competition
defense of § 2(b) are the only two of any real substance in application. See Barton,
op. cit. supra note 33.
In Anheuser-Busch, the FTC found that, although Anheuser-Busch maintained
prices which differed in each market in which it sold, the price resulting from the
price reductions was discriminatory because it did not reflect the historic price dif-
ference of premium beers over region beers. Anheuser-Busch's defense that the price
reduction was made to meet the competition of the regional breweries, was rejected
on the theory that price reduction in such a situation by a seller with a product that
has "greater public acceptance" is not a good faith lowering of price. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) fl 26705. In reversing the Commission
the Seventh Circuit did not consider this aspect of the case, and when the case came
before it for the second time, it again found it unnecessary to decide whether a price
reduction in a premium product which only equalled the prices of competing non-
premium products was in reality an undercut. See note 35 infra. If the reduction were
considered an undercut, the good faith meeting of competition defense would not have
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Because the Seventh Circuit in Anheuser-Busch had rested its
decision entirely upon its holding that the threshold statutory element
of price discrimination had not been established, the Supreme Court
limited its consideration to that question alone. In reversing, there-
fore, the Supreme Court did not decide what constitutes substantial
competitive injury within the meaning of § 2(a) as applied to the
primary-line, or whether Anheuser-Busch's defense of good faith
meeting of competition was valid." In fact, it took pains to say
that "nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as intimating a
view upon the remaining aspects of the controversy,"" and that
"Nothing that we have said, of course, should be construed to be the
expression of any view concerning the relevance of the factors
stressed by . . . [Anheuser-Busch] to statutory standards other than
price discrimination" Nevertheless, the Court did make it quite
clear that, although it was not departing from its holding in FTC v.
been available. For a discussion of this aspect of the case see Notes, 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 567 (1958) ; 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 769 (1958) ; 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1367 (1958) ;
24 Marg. L. Rev. 119 (1958). See also Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers,
Inc., 167 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
36 On remand [Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 29 U.S.L. Week 2352 (Feb, 7, 1961)1,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Commission failed to prove that Anheuser-
Busch's price reductions in 1954 caused any present actual or potential injury to com-
petition. The Court stated that whatever position Anheuser-Busch obtained was
temporary and pointed to the fact that while Anheuser-Busch's share of the St. Louis
market increased 5% between January 1953 and January 1956, the share of its. lead-
ing competitor underwent an increase of almost 14%. It explained the 8% and 11.6%
decline in the market shares of Anheuser-Busch's other two competitors by what it
termed "special circumstances," and laid great emphasis on the fact that the record
did not show how much of their loss was attributable to these special circumstances
and how much resulted solely from the price reductions. It further pointed to the
fact that none of Anheuser-Busch's competitors lost retail customers and each con-
tinued to vary their competitive sales activities and continued to make profits. The
court felt it important that the trial examiner had found that there was no proof that
Anheuser-Busch had used income or profits from the rest of its business to stabilize
losses in St. Louis, or, indeed, that it suffered any losses in St. Louis during the period
of price reductions. The court distinguished the territorial price discrimination cases
relied on by the FTC (see cases in notes 19 and 26 supra) on the ground that:
In each of those cases the motive for the price cut was vindictive and the
effect was punitive. There was not even a pretense that the price change was
incident to a general intensification of the sales effort, as in the case at bar.
It was a single lethal weapon aimed at a victim for a predatory purpose.
Having thus concluded that the record showed no actual present injury, the court,
relying on its reading of Corn Products, supra note 18, refused to find any reasonable
probability or possibility of future adverse effect, again stressing the absence of a
showing of predatory intent.
Because the Court thus found that the record did not support a finding of the
requisite substantial competitive injury, it refused to consider Anheuser-Busch's 2(b)
good faith meeting of competition defense or its contention that the Commission's
order was unduly broad.
36 363 U.S. at 542.
37 Id. at 553.
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Morton Salt Co.," as to adequacy of proof of tendency to injure
competition in secondary-line cases, the more restrictive standard
of proof enunciated in Morton Salt did not apply to primary-line
cases.SO
The argument of Anheuser-Busch that the phrase "discrimination
in price" meant "more than a mere difference" was not wholly with-
out foundation. Previously, in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,4°
a case arising under § 2(0 4 ' of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Su-
preme Court by way of dictum had quoted a statement to this effect
by Representative Utterback, a manager of the conference bill which
later became § 2(a)." In that case the Court had acknowledged
that discrimination might mean either a price difference in sales
between competitors or only such a differential that "puts the un-
favored competitor at a disadvantage." Furthermore, in an opinion
of somewhat doubtful significance, the Ninth Circuit, in 1955, refused
to accept the proposition that a price difference among geographically
disparate customers was tantamount to a discrimination."
Nevertheless, in urging its interpretation, Anheuser-Busch was
attempting to overthrow twenty years of precedent. Several Supreme
Court decisions, while not adjudicating this precise issue, had used
the phrase "price discrimination" interchangeably with price dif-
88 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
39 363 U.S. at 552 n.21. For an analysis of what constitutes substantial injury to
competition within the meaning of § 2(4), see Von Kalinowski, op. cit. supra note 32.
4° 346 U.S. 61, 70 n.10 (1953).
41 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958).
42
 The statement in full is as follows:
In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere
difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relation-
ship exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to
equal treatment, whereby the difference granted to one cast some burden or
disadvantage upon the other. If the two are competing in the resale of the
goods concerned, that relationship exists. Where, also, the price to one is so
low as to involve a sacrifice of some part of the seller's necessary costs and
profits as applied to that business, it leaves that deficit inevitably to be made
up in higher prices to his other customers; and there, too, a relationship may
exist upon which to base the charge of discrimination. But where no such
relationship exists, where the goods are sold in different markets and the con-
ditions affecting those markets set different price levels for them, the sale to
different customers at those different prices would not constitute a discrimina-
tion within the meaning of the bill. 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936).
43 B ahian
 Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra note 19. The court did not
analyze the basis or import of its assertion in this regard, the first of several alternative
holdings. It distinguished both the Moore and Porto Rican cases on their facts
stating that both involved proof of the destruction of competition or possible injury
to a competitor while there was no such proof in Balian. From what has been stated
above it is obvious that this would be good grounds for denying relief. Nevertheless,
the court went on to say that local price discrimination does not violate § 2(a).
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ference, particularly regarding sales among competing customers."
In FTC v. Cement Institute," the Supreme Court flatly defined "dis-
crimination in price" as "selling the same kind of goods cheaper to
one purchaser than to another."" And in Morton Salt the Court said,
"Congress meant by using the words 'discrimination in price' in § 2
that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller's cus-
tomers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged
one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one
or more of the purchaser's competitors.""
As a result of the holding in the principal case it is possible
that a national seller may in the future be reluctant to make wholly
justifiable selective price reductions. He may feel that before he
can make a profitable reduction in any market, he must reduce his
price in all markets.' Such a reluctance on the part of sellers
would indeed give rise to adverse effects upon competition. It would
result in artificial, inflexible prices," never going below that set by
a less efficient competitor in each market. Both sellers and buyers
would be deprived of the full rewards of efficiency, volume produc-
tion, and volume sales.
44
 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 340 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1952) ; FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
supra note 4, at 45 n.13; cf. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
See also, Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 18-20 (2d rev. ed. 1959) ; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United
States: A Survey, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 273, 291-93 (1937) ; Rowe, 66 Yale L.J.,
supra note 32, at 36-38. Cf. Patman, op. cit. supra note 15, at 24 ("The statement
that it shall be unlawful to discriminate in price is of the same effect as to say that
it shall be unlawful to make a different price.").
45 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
46 Id. at 721. Cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., supra note 3, at 116-19;
Samuel H. Moss, Inc., supra note 3 at 379. The exhaustive FTC analysis specifically
addressed to the context of the term "discrimination" is in accord, Purex Corp., Ltd.,
FTC Dkt. 6008, at 4-7 (April 16, 1954), initial decision adopted by the FTC, Trade
Reg. Rep. (1954-1955 FTC Cas.) If 25172 (released Sept. 22, 1954). In the Atlas case,
supra note 16, the Tenth Circuit approved instructions that price discrimination means
"the giving to one of the purchasers an advantage in price not accorded or given to
other purchasers."
47 334 U.S. at 45. The court also stated that it is "self-evident 	 .. that there
is a 'reasonable possibility' that competition may be adversely affected by a practice
under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers sub-
stantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of those customers."
(Id. at 50).
48 It has been suggested that to compel a seller to reduce all his prices, rather
than practice "selective" price reductions, may be more effective in preserving price
rivalry. Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 185-86 (1955). See also, Note,
Competitors Lawful Prices and Lawful Competition, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 327 (1958).
49 See, e.g., Edwards, Maintaining Competition 169-71 (1949) ; Rowe, Price Dis-
crimination Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 Yale
L.J. 929 (1951) ; Note, the "Injury" Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49
Nw. U.L. Rev, 197 (1954). See generally, Aselman, The Consistency of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1953).
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Another possible but more remote danger, arising from the fact
that under Anheuser-Busch every price difference becomes suspect,
is that a seller may be inclined to quote a single uniform price to
all his purchasers whether they be classified as wholesalers, jobbers,
retailers or consumers. Under the prevailing interpretation such
across-the-board transactions would not create a discrimination, not-
withstanding the natural consequence that those retailers who buy
indirectly through wholesalers will ultimately pay more than re-
tailers purchasing directly from the supplier."
To the extent, if any, that either of these two pricing practices
is stimulated, the decision in Anheuser-Busch would frustrate a
basic purpose of the antitrust acts. Freedom to depart from estab-
lished prices is of major importance to our free enterprise system.
Ultimately, it may result in great benefits to the consumer by lower-
ing the whole price level to the extent that prevailing prices may
have been too high. Flexibility in pricing is also especially helpful
to the seller in developing more efficient marketing methods. For
example, departure from traditional prices is often undertaken upon
a territorial basis to open new markets, or experimentally to test
new ventures. Though a possibility exists that the Anheuser-Busch
decision may have the effect of thwarting price flexibility, this is at
most speculative.
On the other hand, the simplicity of the Court's solution has
important advantages. In enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Con-
gress sought to deal with unfettered price cutting activity which
became prevalent with the rise of the chain stores and other large
volume purchasers. Such methods of pricing were regarded as a
potential threat to the entire competitive system. Enforcement of
that Act has already been hobbled because "precision of expression
is not an outstanding characteristic of the Act." 51 Interpreting the
50 Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956), affirming 138 F. Supp. 560
(D. Del. 1956). Lionel is a conventional application of the Robinson-Patman Act
dating back to the Bird case of 1937. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 FTC 548 (1937) ; cf. FTC
v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., supra note 44.
The Lionel court's substantive ruling that a retailer buying through a supplier's
wholesaler was not a "purchaser" from the supplier must not be confused with the
holding of Krug v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956). Krug
decided only that a wholesaler who paid higher prices than some of his supplier's
direct retail accounts sustained actionable competitive injury when his own retail
customers were harmed by the price advantages secured by their direct buying
competitors. Krug thus concerned merely the competitive impact-of a price differential
among his direct purchasers, whereas in Lionel no such differential among different
purchasers existed. See 57 Colum. L. Rev. 429 (1957) ; Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of
Commodities in Commerce, 67 Yale L.J. 1155 (1958).
51 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953).
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phrase "discrimination in price" as meaning anything more than a
simple price difference would have compounded the legal and economic
complexities already inherent in proving violations. If the equitable-
ness of specific price differentials were made the test, then not only
would variations in price among different products be exempt, as
the Act itself provides, but also an exotic variety of economically
rationalized price spreads among "commodities of like grade and
quality" might similarly claim exemption. Inevitably, every legal
controversy involving any price difference would come to center
upon an ad hoc resolution of "discrimination" divorced from the
specifically pertinent statutory text, rather than upon the detailed
governing provisions relating to injury, cost justification, meeting
competition, etc." Obviously, this is not what Congress intended.
The plain language of the statute clearly demonstrates that Congress
intended to and did prohibit all price discriminations substantially
injuring competition subject to certain defined defenses. The formula
adopted by the Court promises in the future to fulfill this Congres-
sional intent by shifting emphasis from the determination of "dis-
crimination" to consideration of these other provisions. Viewed in
this light, the real benefits to enforcement likely to flow from the
decision, as a practical matter, far outweigh any hypothetical injury
to competition.
This is the position adopted by Rowe, 66 Yale L.J., supra note 32, at 38, and
relied upon by the Court, 363 U.S. at 551. Other commentators have generally shared
this view. See note 44 supra.
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